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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
D. Colo. 
Estate of Simmons v. N.G.L. Holdings, LLC, No 16-cv-02462-RBJ, 2017 WL 
6310482 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 2017). 
This case concerns a property dispute wherein Estate claims ownership to a mineral 
estate beneath the surface estate owned by Company. The property at issue was 
conveyed to Company from Estate, but Estate argues that the mineral and surface 
interests were severed and that only the surface interest was conveyed. Company 
disputes, claiming that the mineral and surface interests automatically merged into 
one ownership interest under Estate and that when the property at issue was 
conveyed to Company, both the surface and mineral interests were transferred. On 
this, Company moved for summary judgment. The District of Colorado denied 
Company’s motion. The court noted that this is a matter of first impression before 
the court, the issue being “do mineral and surface estates automatically merge as a 
matter of law when they are united ownership?”. Drawing from Colorado law in 
the boundary and easement contexts, the court held that, yes, mineral and surface 
interests automatically merge when united under common ownership. However, the 
court denied Company’s motion because a genuine issue existed as to whether 
Estate intended to “re-sever” the mineral estate before conveying the property to 
Company.  
 
S.D. Texas  
 
Glassell Non-Operated Interests, Ltd. v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, L.L.C., No. H-16-
1573, 2017 WL 6626652 (S.D. Tex., Dec. 28, 2017). 
 
Developers, individuals, and other entities (collectively, “Developers”) jointly 
entered into an Agreement to share in the “royalties, minerals, or other rights in a 
40-Square-mile tract” of land. The Agreement included a provision which required 
that if any of the Developers acquired the interest held by any other Developer, the 
acquiring Developer must share the acquired interest among the rest. One 
Developer (“Acquiror”) obtained an interest from two other Developers but refused 
to share. First, Acquiror claimed the Agreement exempted it from sharing, but the 
court found that because Acquiror did not obtain these new interests before the 
agreement was finalized, it must share. Second, Acquiror claims the statute of 
frauds bars enforcement of the agreement because its surveyor claimed the relevant 
tract was not described “with reasonable certainty.” But, the court concluded that 
because Acquiror’s survey was “inadequately precise” and another surveyor came 
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to the opposite conclusion, the statute of frauds does not bar enforcement of the 
Agreement. Finally, because Acquiror did not partially perform, the Agreement is 
enforceable, and it must share in its newly obtained interests. This case has since 
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.  
 
Federal Claims  
 
Waverly View Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 750 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 
2018).  
 
Property Owner sued Government, claiming that Government’s operation of 
pollution-monitoring wells on Property Owner’s land constituted a physical taking 
of Property Owner’s property. Government had originally obtained consent for the 
wells based on a right of entry agreement. However, the wells remained after the 
right of entry agreement had expired. The court determined that Government’s 
continued activities on Property Owner’s land after the right of entry agreement 
expired constituted a physical taking. Furthermore, the court stated that Property 
Owner was entitled to compensation for each square foot of occupied property.  
 




Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109. 
 
In 2009, Corporation filed an interpleader action to determine who held rights to 
certain oil and gas proceeds and seeking declaratory judgment. It was determined 
California Heirs, Kansas Heirs, and two business entities managed by Manger all 
had valid claims to the proceeds. The Kansas Heirs and one of Manger’s business 
entities withdrew their claims, leaving only the remaining business entity 
(“Company”) and the California Heirs. Company claimed that it was entitled to the 
proceeds because it had obtained the mineral deeds from the California Heirs; the 
California Heirs counter-argued that Company had obtained the deeds through 
fraud and deceit. The trial court found that Manager had represented Company in 
the dealings and had told the California Heirs that there was no production in the 
mineral interest at issue, even though he had already received over $1 million in 
proceeds from the lands. The trial court also determined that Company was merely 
an alter ego of Manager, and thus pierced the corporate veil, leaving Manager and 
Company jointly liable for Corporations’ litigation fees and granted fees and costs. 
Manager was subsequently successful in the court of appeals on his argument that 
he had not been made a party to the case when he was held liable. However, 
Manager’s petition for exemplary damages against the court was denied by the 
Supreme Court of Colorado. The court did granted certiorari for Corporation’s writ, 
stating that Manager was properly joined in the case. It found that Company was 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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simply Manager’s alter ego which pierced the corporate veil, making his joint and 
several liability proper, especially since the court found that Manager had adequate 




Adamson v. Drill Baby Drill, LLC, 409 P.3d 874 (Table) (Kan. Ct. App. 2018). 
 
Landowners claimed that Exploration Company’s (“Company”) two oil and gas 
leases had terminated for cessation of production in paying quantities. Both 
Landowners and Company moved for summary judgment, and the trial court 
granted summary judgment to Company for both leases. Landowners appealed and 
Company cross-appealed for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed 
summary judgment for several reasons. First, the court held that the lower court 
properly determined that Landowners had the burden of proof because the party 
claiming cessation of production in paying quantities must present factual evidence 
that it has ceased. Second, summary judgement was proper because Landowners 
failed to show that there was a cessation of production in paying quantities. Third, 
summary judgement was proper because Landowners failed to refute ratification of 
one of the leases by the mineral interest owners. Finally, the court remanded 
Company’s cross-appeal because the trial court had not ruled on any award for 




Briarwood Group, L.L.C. v. Calhoun, 51,732 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/18/18), No. 
51,732-CA, 2018 WL 458145. 
 
Landowner conveyed “non-executive mineral rights” to Mineral Owner and later 
conveyed an oil and gas lease to Lessee, which was later assigned to Assignee. 
Later Mineral Owner transferred interest to Subsequent Mineral Owners, and had 
an agreement that Subsequent Mineral Owners and Landowner would each receive 
a twenty-five percent royalty, and that Landowner’s royalty and non-executive 
right would terminate upon her death. One Subsequent Mineral Owner later sued 
Landowner arguing Landowner did not have the right to execute the lease. The 
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Landowner on the basis that 
Landowner “signed the [conveyance of mineral rights] in their individual 
capacity.” Subsequent Mineral Owners claim it was improper for the lower court to 
grant summary judgment “because an issue of material fact exists as to whether 
[Landowner] intended convey their individual interests.” Here, the appellate court 
agreed with Subsequent Mineral Owners and reversed summary judgment. The 
primary reason for this is that intent of the landowner was disputed and, by its 
nature, a “determination of intent is not appropriate for summary judgment.” This 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Ellis v. McKenzie, 457 Md. 323 (Md. 2018). 
 
Surface Owners had Mineral Owners mineral interests terminated in January 2013 
pursuant to Maryland’s Dormant Mineral Interests Act (“Act”). Mineral Owners 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The trial court found that the Act was 
constitutional and terminated Mineral Owners’ mineral interests; the appellate 
court affirmed. Mineral Owners appealed to the additional appellate court. That 
court also affirmed, holding that the Notices of Intent were invalid because they 
were not filed prior to the Petition for Termination. The court further held that the 
Act was not retrospective as to violate Mineral Owners’ due process rights and did 




Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2018). 
 
City appealed a regulatory decision in favor of Interest Group which found that 
City’s zoning laws violated the Dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) of the United 
States Constitution as well as several state laws. Generally, the zoning laws restrict 
expansion of “Bulk Fossil Fuel Terminals.” The appellate court determined that the 
zoning laws were not a violation of DCC because there was not an adequate 
showing by Interest Group that there was discrimination between in-state and out-
of-state business. Specifically, the court noted that the two groups identified by 
Interest Group, “in-state purchasers and end users,” could not satisfy the DCC 
discrimination requirement because they were not “substantially similar out-of-
state and in-state economic entities.” What’s more, the court determined that any 
burden imposed on interstate commerce was not “clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits” here, those benefits include things like protecting health 
and public safety. The first state law at issue provides that laws such as the zoning 
laws passed by City must have “[A]n adequate factual base” for their conclusions. 
The appellate court found it appropriate for the regulatory entity below to 
determine that one of the factual bases of the zoning laws lacked “substantial 
evidence.” Finally, the zoning laws do comply with state law providing that “A 
transportation plan shall . . . facilitate the flow of goods and services. . . .” This is 
because there is no dispute that the zoning laws do not “directly alter a 
[transportation system plan.]” 
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Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04–16–00827–CV, 2018 WL 280408 (Tex. App. Jan. 3, 2018).   
 
Grantees sued Grantors seeking a declaration that no reservation or exception of 
royalty interests had been conveyed by a warranty deed. The trial court determined 
that the warranty deed did convey all royalty interests to Grantees and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Grantees. Grantors appealed. The court of appeals 
reversed for several reasons. First, even though the deed grouped reservations and 
exceptions under a singular heading, the four items listed were exceptions to the 
conveyance. Second, the fourth exception unambiguously referenced all royalty 
interests devised to Grantors by a previous will. Third, the exception prohibited the 
deed from passing all of the royalty interest to Grantees because the interests 
remained vested in Grantors. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 
state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
Crimson Expl., Inc. v. Magnum Producing L.P., Number 13-15-00013-CV, 2017 
WL 6616740 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2017).  
Since the early 1990s, Owner has held a mineral interest in an oil and gas lease 
(“Lease #1”), which was operated by Operator. In 2006, a trial court deemed Lease 
#1 invalid as of year 1996. Before that judgment, Owner and Operator entered into 
a Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) guaranteeing Owner’s interest in the 
Lease (after the lease expires) and granting Owner an overriding royalty interest 
that could be converted into a working interest. The parties also entered into a letter 
agreement (“Letter”) which concerned Owner’s interest in several top leases which 
Operator held. In 2006, shortly after the judgment nullifying Lease #1, Operator 
changed its records to reflect that Owner in fact did not have any interest in any 
well on the acreage. Owner sued for breach of contract and was awarded summary 
judgment by the trial court. Operator appealed arguing that the Letter was not 
“formal enough” to confer Owner with an interest in the lease. The court disagreed 
with Operator and affirmed the trial court. The court held that it is not necessary to 
use formal language found in deeds to affect a conveyance of real property and that 
the Letter plainly ensured Owner’s interest in current and future top leases. 
Similarly, the court held that Letter shows that both parties intended to be bound by 
the agreement and thus Operator breached the contract when they stopped paying 
working interest to Owner. Finally, the court held that pre-judgment interest was 
not due to Owner because Operator reasonably doubted Owner’s title to the 
working interest at issue.  
  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/9
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Haywood WI Units, Ltd. v. B&S Dunagan Investments, Ltd., No. 13-15-00454-CV, 
2017 WL 6379737 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2017).  
 
Royalty Owner sued Lessor claiming that he owned a larger royalty interest than 
that which he was being paid and that Lessor was not the holder of the executive 
right. The dispositive issue was whether Lessor owned a quarter of the royalty 
interest, or less as Royalty Owner claimed. Lessor originally owned a one-half 
interest in the mineral estate. The court determined that Lessor owned a quarter 
royalty interest even after conveying part of its interest to a third party by deed. The 
deed stated that Lessor would “share equally in the mineral lease bonuses, rentals, 
royalties or other sums received.” The court held that this language meant that 
Lessor retained one half of its original royalty interest, making its current royalty 
interest one quarter. The court determined that the second issue did not need to be 
decided because Royalty Owner was properly paid his fair share of royalty.  
 
Midstream – Federal 
 
D. District of Columbia  
 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 280 F.Supp.3d 187 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 
Native American Tribe (“Tribe”) brought a claim requesting that the court insure 
three specific conditions on an oil pipeline: “(1) the finalization and 
implementation of oil-spill response plans at Lake Oahe; (2) completion of third-
party compliance audit; and (3) public reporting of information regarding pipeline 
operations.” The court agreed with these requests, finding them reasonable and 
necessary. Accordingly, the court imposed these measure on the Army Corps of 
Engineering. 
 
N.D. Ohio  
 
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 5:17-2062, 2017 WL 6624511 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2017).  
 
Company sought to condemn city property to conduct evaluations to properly 
install a pipeline. Company brought a motion for partial summary judgment and 
motion for preliminary injunction and both were granted by the district court. 
Regarding the motion for partial summary judgment, the court analyzed that 
Company only holds the “substantive right to condemn” if certain elements are 
met. The court determined that Company did meet those elements, finding first that 
the project was authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, despite 
attempts to challenge the certificate of authorization. Second, the subject land was 
indispensable to the project. Lastly, Company did conduct “good faith 
negotiations,” to gain access to the property prior to initiating the condemnation, 
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and the court also found that it did not need to follow special procedures set out by 
state law, even though the public land was held by a municipality, because “the 
federal right of condemnation . . . [is] superior” to the state law on such procedure. 
The court therefore held that the company had the power to condemn and such 
action would cause little harm in this case because the access was for a specific and 
narrowly defined section of property, for a specific purpose, and the project was 
being carried out for public benefit. Regarding the motion for temporary injunction, 
the court held that the request was for only narrowly defined sections of property 
directly related to the placement of the pipeline and only to evaluate/survey for 
alignment/proper placement of the pipeline and environmental concerns/issues 
related to pipeline. Furthermore, even though this is challenged as a “quick take,” 
since the court determined that Company has the power of eminent domain, they 
should also be granted right to possess immediately. This case has been appealed, 
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7th Circuit  
 
Alexander v. Ingram Barge Co., 876 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 
Flood Victims (“Victims”) filed suit against Federal Agency and Company after 
Company’s barge broke apart in a storm and damaged a local dam, causing 
significant flooding. The district court found that responsibility for the incident 
rested solely with Federal Agency, which was exempt from suit under the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity. Victims filed appealed, alleging that Company shared some 
of the blame for its negligent actions. Victims’ argument hinged on the assertion 
that Company violated three Inland Navigation Rules—Rules 2, 5, and 7. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the case and held as follows: (1) the 
district court made no clear error in its determination that Rule 2 was not violated; 
(2) because the findings of the lower court in its examination of whether Rule 5 
was violated were supported by the record and not clearly marred by legal error, 
the only available conclusion was that the lower court’s reasoning was sound; and 
(3) without finding clear error in the lower court’s ruling that the facts did not 
establish a violation of Rule 7, it too must be upheld. For those reasons, and 
because the district court’s finding that Federal Agency was solely responsible was 
also free of any clear error, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling. 
 
D. Colo.  
 
Audubon Soc’y of Greater Denver v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 14-cv-
02749-PAB, 2017 WL 6334229 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization brought suit against Federal Agency challenging 
Federal Agency’s reallocation plan to move water from “flood control to storage 
for municipal and industrial use.” Environmental Organization’s complaint 
included claims brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Operating under a presumption of validity, the 
the district court assessed Federal Agency’s action. First, the court held that Federal 
Agency had not violated NEPA because: (1) the use of the language that was not 
clearly defined did nothing to take away from the objective, reasonable, good faith 
showing of the topics that must be addressed under NEPA to allow for public 
participation; (2) Federal Agency’s failure to specifically discuss potential changes 
to water rights due to its action was not significant enough that it frustrated public 
participation by withholding information necessary to have informed participation; 
and (3) Federal Agency sufficiently considered the reasonable alternatives put forth 
by Environmental Organization. The court then held that Federal Agency’s action 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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did not violate the CWA because: (1) the position that “NEPA alternatives” should 
have been examined as part of Federal Agency’s CWA analysis was unsupported 
by sufficient case law, and thus rejected, and (2) there was no legal or policy reason 
to apply the NEPA anti-segmentation rule to the CWA analysis. For those reasons, 
the court affirmed Federal Agency’s decision. This case has since been appealed, 
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Federal Claims  
 
Welty v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 538 (Fed. Cl. 2017). 
 
Farmer’s land was flooded by water because of a levee on Neighbor’s land that was 
constructed voluntarily in conjunction with a federal conservation agency 
(“Agency”). Farmer sued Neighbor in 2005 for the damage to the property, but the 
suit was dismissed. Farmer then brought suit against Agency for inverse 
condemnation without adequate compensation. The trial court found that although 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations could not be granted because Farmer 
was on notice of the damage to his land in 2005 and neither Agency nor Neighbor 
fraudulently concealed the damage to the property, the stabilization doctrine 
applied which allowed Farmer to bring the suit whenever it became clear that 
Agency’s actions had amounted to a taking of his property. The court ultimately 
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, however, because Farmer had failed 
to show that Agency’s actions were the direct cause of Farmer’s injury. This case 







Dep’t of Finance v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 18 Cal. App. 5th 661, 226 Cal. 
Rptr.3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017). 
 
Water Board provided county “and the cities located in the county” (together, 
“County”) with a particular permit. Pursuant to issuance of the permit, County had 
“to implement various programs to manage [its] urban runoff.” Related to these 
requirements, the state constitution requires that the state pay local governments in 
certain circumstances. The state, however, is not constitutionally obligated to pay 
local government when the regulations imposed by local government are 
“mandated by a federal law or regulation.” The court ultimately determined that 
this was not a case where regulations were mandated by the federal government 
because it only required regulation of “pollutants to the maximum extent 
practicable,” and no other specific regulation was required. Accordingly, the case is 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/9
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reversed and remanded such that the state is required to reimburse some of the 




Black Canyon Irrigation Dist. v. State, 408 P.3d 899 (Idaho 2018). 
 
The United States was decreed rights to specific quantities of water in the Cascade 
and Deadwood Reservoirs, whose stream flows often exceeded their respective 
capacities. On January 31, 2013, the United States filed a Late Claim to assert 
“supplemental beneficial use storage water rights” claims against State and Water 
Company in the two reservoirs, in which Irrigation District, in response, asserted 
that such claims were unnecessary. The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Irrigation District but also rejected the assertion that the Late Claims were 
unnecessary. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court 
decision holding that: (1) the grant of summary judgement against United States 
was appropriate because all three requirements of res judicata had been met, thus 
barring Irrigation District from attempting to supplement water quantities which 
had been previously granted; (2) the special master, who made recommendations in 
the lower proceeding, exceeded the district court’s orders of reference by making 
an “alternative basis” recommendation because it intruded upon the Director’s duty 
of administering water; and (3) because Irrigation District acted in good faith, no 
attorney fees were to be granted. 
 
Barnes v. Jackson, 408 P.3d 1266 (Idaho 2018). 
 
Landowner-1 claimed that Landowner-2 and his predecessor in interest had 
forfeited the water right to the land in 2014 because it had not been used for over 
five years. Landowner-1 alleged that the predecessor to Landowner-2 had not made 
beneficial use of the water right for over five years, so it was forfeited before being 
purportedly conveyed to Landowner-2. The trial court granted summary judgment 
to Landowner-2. The appellate court affirmed, holding that even if Landowner 2’s 
predecessor had forfeited his right, the “no control” exception applied to the 
predecessor and caused the five-year time period for water right forfeiture to restart 




Maumee Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Buescher, 3rd Dist. Putnman, No. 12-17-
06, 2017 WL 6450826 (Dec. 18, 2017). 
 
Water conservation district (“District”), to address its floodplain, appraised and 
attempted to purchase acreage from Landowners 1 and 2 to divert water from a 
nearby river. Both Landowners refused to sell, so District filed a petition to take the 
land by eminent domain. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to 
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District, and Landowners appealed. On appeal, both Landowners claimed that the 
trial court did not have jurisdiction because District’s purchase price offer was too 
low to be considered realistically, and because District’s petition was not in 
accordance with the state’s eminent domain laws. Because District gave both 
Landowners thirty-days’ notice of its intent to acquire the property, had given a 
written good faith offer to Landowners, and had adequately shown the public need 




Transcanada Hydro Ne., Inc. v. Town of Newbury, No. 2016-061, 2017 WL 
6210911 (Vt. Dec. 8, 2017). 
 
Company erected a dam and entered into a negotiation with Township for a flow 
easement, which is a right to commit trespass in the form of intentional flooding of 
land upstream from the dam. In calculating the land affected by this trespass, 
Company calculated that 19 acres of land would be directly subject to the flooding 
caused by the dam. Township, however, argued that the effects of a dam would 
instead affect over 1964 acres. The trial court agreed with Township’s survey, 
removed certain land that fell beyond the 100-year flood level, and set the 
appropriate amount of acreage covered under the flow easement at 1859 acres. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont agreed with this acreage calculation, and 
recognized that every flood has unique peak levels, and that subsequent floods may 
continue to add to the cumulative area flooded by the dam. Furthermore, in 
determining the price per acre to be paid in the easement, Company calculated the 
easements historically paid for the 19 acres of “limited utility” property and argued 
that the appropriate price per acre for the easement was $500. Township instead 
calculated the median price for flow easements over the much larger 1964 acres 
calculated in its initial survey and argued that the appropriate value was $1,100 per 
acre. The trial court accepted Township’s method of valuation, but adjusted for a 
number of economic factors to arrive at a price of $836 per acre. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Vermont noted that a presumption of validity attached to 
Township’s valuation model, and the burden rested on Company to overcome that 
presumption. Because Company failed to take into account the proper amount of 
acreage affected by the flooding and to price accordingly, they presented no 
evidence to rebut the presumption. The Supreme Court of Vermont therefore 
affirmed the calculations of the trial court, maintaining the overall value of flow 
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VanMatre v. Davenport, 2017 Ark. App. 703, 537 S.W.3d 287. 
 
Landowner-1 purchased land that already had a twenty-five-foot easement which 
included a fence originally built to keep cattle off of the land. The fence had been 
there for eight years but, according to Landowner-1’s predecessor, its removal 
would not negatively affect ingress and egress to the property. The fence was taken 
down by Landowner-2 and Landowner-1 sued for an injunction to have the fence 
rebuilt and argued that he had been given an exclusive easement by the agreement 
with his predecessor. The trial court granted injunctive relief to Landowner-1 and 
ordered that Landowner-2 restore the fence. It also found that Landowner-1 had an 
exclusive right to the twenty-five-foot easement. The appellate court reversed the 
trial court’s finding, holding that there was no exclusive easement given to 
Landowner-1. It reasoned that the necessary intent to grant an exclusive easement 
to Landowner-1 was impossible to find when examining the four corners of the 
original agreement between Landowner-1 and his predecessor. The court remanded 




Clews Land & Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2017). 
 
Landowner sued City after City approved a plan to construct a schoolhouse on 
acreage adjoining Landowner’s property used to raise and train horses. Landowner 
alleged that City improperly accepted a mitigated negated declaration (“MND”) in 
evaluating the environmental impact of the school’s construction rather than an 
Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”). The trial court held that Landowner 
opposed the project only because it negatively impacted his business economically, 
rather than for environmental concerns, and found in favor of City. The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court, first noting that Landowner’s claim was disallowed 
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but considered the merits 
of the case as well. The court discussed that a MND may be adopted without 
demanding an EIR, unless a party challenging a project can show a fair argument 
that the project may have a significant effect on the environment. Landowner 
argued that the project would create a fire hazard, increase or impede traffic and 
transportation, increase noise, reduce recreational activities, and affect historical 
resources. However, Landowner offered no evidence as to why the project would 
do so, and the court noted that the school’s developers had actually taken concrete 
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measures to reduce the risk of these hazards lower than the risk posed before the 
project was underway. Therefore, because there was no showing that there were no 
significant effects on the environment, adoption of the MND without an EIR was 
permissible. Finally, while Landowner argued that the project violated the town’s 
“open space” policies, he offered no evidence as to why City’s determination to 
adopt the project was unreasonable, which is the burden of proof in challenging an 




Rosenquist v. Circle K Family Farms, A17-0279, 2017 WL 6418872 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 18, 2017). 
 
Citizen was against a conditional-use permit (“CUP”) application by Farm to build 
a hog-confinement facility. Citizen argued that the facility would violate a number 
of minimum mandatory requirements set forth in the county zoning ordinance. 
Specifically, Citizen was worried the facility would lower property values, create 
environmental problems, violate the odor-offset ordinance, and create a nuisance. 
The trial court disagreed, finding for Farm. It turned to the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency’s (“MPCA”) analysis of these issues, which found nothing in 
Farm’s application that would pose an environmental risk or violate the county 
zoning ordinance. The appellate court affirmed the County Board of 
Commissioners’ (“Board”) decision, holding that it would be acceptable to grant a 
conditional-use permit to Farm so that it could build a hog-confinement facility. It 
held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in the granting of Farm’s CUP. This 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New Jersey Tax Court  
 
Russo v. Twp. of Plumsted, No. 015983-2012, 2017 WL 6629174 (N.J. Tax Dec. 
28, 2017). 
 
Landowner purchased a parcel of land and started farming activities on the land. 
The municipal Tax assessor granted farmland assessment for the property in 2000. 
That treatment remained in place until 2010. In 2011, Landowner submitted an 
application to the assessor for farmland assessment of the property for the 2011 tax 
year. Tax Assessor only granted farmland assessment to part of the land because 
Landowner was using the land for both farming and non-farming purposes. 
Landowner continued to request the same tax assessment the next year. Landowner 
filed an appeal of the denial with the County Board of Taxation (“Board”). The Tax 
Assessor never visited the property to conduct her assessment of the property; 
however, she determined that the dominate use of the land had returned to 
agricultural or horticultural use. However, farmland assessment is based on the 
active devotion of the property to agricultural or horticultural use for two 
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successive years immediately preceding the tax year at issue. The Board issued a 
judgment affirming the Tax Assessors decision. Landowner filed a complaint 
challenging the judgment. The tax court noted that the statute regarding farmland 
assessment required the two years active agricultural or horticultural use before it 
may be granted. The court found that although Landowner used the property for 
agricultural or horticultural use, he failed to produce evidence establishing the 
nature and extent of the use. There is no evidence regarding the number of 
livestock or the crops planted or harvested. Because the Landowner failed to meet 
the preponderance of evidence requirement that the property was devoted to or 
dedicated to agricultural or horticultural use during the 2012 tax year the court up 
held the Board’s judgment. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 




D. New Mexico  
 
Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, CIV 12-0800 RB/JHR, 2017 WL 6512230 
(D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2017). 
 
Native American tribe (“Tribe”) sought action against United States under Quiet 
Title Act and state common law. Tribe alleges that United States, after purchasing 
land in 2000, made attempts to limit members from enforcing their aboriginal title. 
Gas Company intervened, asserting its easement rights in relation to a pipeline 
which crosses the land in dispute. Gas Company deposed another tribe, (“Tribe-2”) 
who has also used the same land for confidential purposes, by written questions to 
maintain Tribe-2’s confidentiality. Tribe notified Gas Company that it planned to 
attend the next confidential deposition of a third tribe (“Tribe-3”) Gas Company 
subsequently moved for a protective order precluding all parties and associated 
counsel from attending Tribe-3’s deposition, and Tribe opposed the motion. The 
district court granted the Protective Order and denied Tribe’s Motion to Strike, 
finding that depositions by written questions are generally not attended by parties, 
and even when this is allowed, counsel is unable to interject. Further, Tribe-2’s 
deposition cannot be stricken as it is not a pleading.  
 
E.D. Oklahoma  
 
Dobbs v. United States Forest Serv., No. CIV-16-112-RAW, 2017 WL 6598537 
(E.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2017).  
 
Landowner owns 160-acre tract of land that is completely surrounded by Upper 
Kiamichi Wilderness (“Wilderness”) in Oklahoma. Because the property is 
completely surrounded, the only access onto the property is on a foot path. 
Landowner filed an application for special access to build a gravel road to his 
property. During the pending application, Landowner attempted access on the foot 
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path and fell and broke his leg. The United States Forest Service (“USFS”), who 
manages the Wilderness, issued an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) denying 
Landowner’s request. The Wilderness Act allows for adequate access to private 
property that is within the Wilderness. Another Act requires for reasonable 
enjoyment of private land within the USFS. Landowner appealed USFS’s final 
decision. USFS noted that it did not preclude Landowner from requesting a last 
intrusive access to the property. USFS’s EA noted that granting Landowner special 
access would go against the USFS’s own interpretation of their regulations. The 
district court noted that it must give deference to the USFS interpretation of 
regulations. The court concluded that USFS based its decision on an adequate 
review of the evidence. It noted that the decision was not arbitrary or an abuse of 
district. Therefore, the district court upheld USFS’s decision. This case has since 
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication. 
 
Tax Court  
 
Salt Point Timber, LLC v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 633 
(Tax 2017). 
 
Company granted a conservation easement to a Conservation Organization and 
listed the conservation easement as a charitable deduction its taxes. The IRS denied 
the deduction. The tax court determined that the IRS was correct to deny the 
deduction for two primary reasons. First, after analyzing the possible outcomes of 
what may happen to the conservation easement, the tax court determined that the 
easement could end up in the hands of an entity that is not considered a “qualified 
organization” as defined by the relevant tax regulation. Second, Company failed to 
adequately demonstrate that even if it were possible that the conservation easement 
was to end up in the hands of an entity that was not a “qualified organization,” that 




Reeves v. Godspeed Props., LLC, Nos. S-15461/15482, 2018 WL 561386 (Alaska 
Jan 26, 2018). 
 
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 over the validity of an appurtenant easement 
allegedly created by deed. Landowner 1 argues that one of the words in the deed is 
not actually a word and, therefore, the deed is ambiguous. The Supreme Court of 
Alaska said, however, that although the language Landowner 1 refers to is akin to a 
spelling mistake, such mistakes are not dispositive. Further, the use of that word 
only had “one reasonable interpretation.” The court also considered what kind of 
easement was created by the deed. Here, because that determination was 
ambiguous, the court analyzed “the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
conveyance.” On this issue, the court deferred to the lower court’s determination 
that because the way the easement existed, it “clearly created a servient estate [] in 
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favor of a dominant estate.” Therefore, the court said, an appurtenant easement was 
created. Next, the court determined that it was error for the lower court to 
determine “that the entire easement was terminated by prescription.” Instead, the 
court determined that only part of the easement was terminated. Part of the 
easement was extinguished because a gold plant on part of the properties in dispute 
was determined to be “a permanent improvement,” and it was not clear error for the 
lower court to determine that. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; 




Jaffe v. Bradshaw, D069824, 2017 WL 6505782 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017).  
 
Landowner owns land immediately above the lot that Neighbor owns. Landowner 
bought the property in 1982 and maintains and harvests a part-time commercial 
enterprise. Neighbor bought his land in 2009 and does not live at the home full 
time. The only vehicle access to Neighbor’s property is a road that runs alongside 
the edge of Landowners property. Neighbor has an easement to use the roadway set 
forth in the legal description of Neighbor’s property. After Neighbor purchased the 
property, he started making improvement to the easement of the road by widening 
the road and providing a turnabout. The improvements caused problems to 
Landowner’s property. Neighbor had installed a pipe adjacent to Landowner’s 
property when it was owned by the previous land owner. Neighbor brought a cause 
of action to which Landowner brought a cross claim. The trial court found that 
Neighbor failed to meet the burden of proof about his claims of public nuisance, 
negligence, and private nuisance. The trial court granted Landowner’s request for 
declaratory relief concerning Neighbor’s temporary parking easement road because 
it found that as a matter of law, this request to prevent Neighbor from parking on 
the easement because the act is a means to interfere with Landowner’s reasonable 
use of the property. The trial court also found that the injunction will cause no harm 
to Neighbor. The trial court also found that it was not illegal for Land Owner to put 
in the pipe. The appellate court affirmed the lower court finding that Neighbor’s 
arguments failed because of the factual premise. This is an unpublished opinion of 
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.  
 
McBride v. Smith, A147931, 227 Cal. Rptr.3 d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).  
 
This dispute between adjacent landowners involved an easement allowing the use 
of a shared driveway for secondary ingress and egress or emergency access. 
Landowner-2’s complaint alleged that Landowner-1 installed fixtures on the 
easement area that prevented Landowner-2 from using the driveway as pursuant to 
the easement terms and the longtime use as primary access by herself and her 
predecessors. Landowner-2 claims that she had been using the easement for 
primary access openly for years and so had a prescriptive easement for primary 
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access. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded for 
several reasons. First, the court held that Landowner-2 did not have enough 
supporting evidence to show that Landowner-2 had committed a nuisance, 
effectively depriving Landowner-2 of access to and enjoyment of her property. 
Landowner-2 only introduced facts that showed that her access to the easement for 
secondary access was compromised, not that she could not access the property that 
she actually owned. However, second, the court held that Landowner-2 presented 
enough support for a claim for a prescriptive easement, since she claimed that her 
use had been open, known and on a “daily basis” for years, which is a dramatic 
deviation from the original terms of the easement. The court held that she had a 
nuisance claim but did not adequately state how the installed poles and chains 
disturbed or prohibited her use of her property right in the secondary access 
easement. However, the court held that she did have a “claim as a matter of law” 
because the facts presented support a claim for prescriptive easement. Therefore, 
the court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for resolution in 




City of Lakewood v. Armstrong, 2017 COA 159. 
 
In 1984, a prior landowner granted a permanent public easement to County who 
then deeded the same to City. In 2011, the current landowners (“Landowners”) 
bought the land subject to the easement and attempted to prevent access to the 
easement by locking a gate to its entrance. In 2015, City sought to quiet title and 
sought other remedial measures. Landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the 
easement was invalid. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court 
determined that the easement was valid and entered summary judgment in favor of 
City. The appellate court affirmed, founding that the easement was validly 
conveyed and that the lack of express description of the dominant estate and the 
lack express notice did not invalidate the easement. The court determined that 
easements are reasonably certain and valid when they provide “in accurate detail, 
the size, dimensions, type of use, and location of the easement on the servient 
tenement, as well as the precise legal description of the servient property.” It 
further noted that an easement recorded in the County Clerk’s Office is sufficient to 




Goldman v. Lustig, No. 4D16-1933, 2018 WL 527011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 
2018). 
 
Landowners filed an action seeking to declare their right to use a portion of a dock 
on Waterfront Landowner’s property. Landowners also sought an injunction 
against Waterfront Landowner disallowing any prohibition against using the dock. 
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The community in which Landowners and Waterfront Landowner lived established 
a homeowner’s association. The homeowner’s association formed an Agreement 
with Waterfront Landowner that severed all riparian rights of a portion of the dock 
that was located on Waterfront Landowner’s property. Landowners argued that 
they had the right to use the dock pursuant to the Agreement and an easement by 
necessity. The court held that Landowners had a right to the portion of the dock 
that was expressed in the Agreement. The court concluded that Waterfront 
Landowner waived any arguments against the Agreement when he conceded at trial 
that he only owned and had rights to a certain portion of the dock. The court also 
held that Landowners were not entitled to an easement by necessity of Waterfront 
Landowner’s property, concluding that, because the Landowners also lived off 
waterfront property and could construct a pier to allow access to the dock from 
their own properties, it was not an absolute necessity for Landowners to use 




Rainbow Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Holm, 2018 IL App (3d) 160715. 
 
A Boy Scouts of America Troop (“Troop”) filed a temporary restraining order 
against Landowner for the use of a path adjacent to property Troop used for its 
scouting activities. Landowner argued that Troop could access the property without 
use of the path by driving six or seven miles, and that Troop was trespassing on his 
property when using the path. The trial court granted the injunction, reasoning that 
Troop had a prescriptive easement to use the path to access the property. It noted 
that to restrict such use would cause an irreparable injury to Troop. Landowner 
appealed, and the appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings. Landowner 
argued that Troop brought suit with unclean hands, but the court found that Troop 
was guilty of no misconduct, fraud, or bad faith, and that it had made reasonable 
efforts to prevent its invitees from accidentally trespassing Landowner’s driveway. 
It further held that there was no reasonable alternative for Troop to access its 





Ellington v. Becraft, 534 S.W.3d 785 (Ky. 2017). 
 
Individual sued for a declaratory judgment against Property Owner asking that a 
passway be recognized as a public road. The district court entered judgment for 
Individual, holding that the road was a public passway and that Individual had 
obtained an easement by prescription. The appellate court reversed and Individual 
appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, holding that evidence was insufficient to prove that the road 
was entirely public, but that the portion which passed over the Individual’s 
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property was public. The court also abrogated a prior decision relevant to the legal 
issues presented, that “proof of county control for any period of time is not 
necessary to establish a common law public road.” Lastly, the court held that six 




Nicoli v. Gooby Indus. Corp., 16-P-1652, 2017 WL 6390941 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 
15, 2017). 
 
Servient Landowners filed an action to enforce a contract between Servient 
Landowners and Dominant Landowner. The contract provided that Servient 
Landowner would convey an easement to Dominant Landowner to allow Dominant 
Landowner to erect a retaining wall of the edge of Servient Landowners’ property. 
In return, Servient Landowners could purchase a piece of land from Dominant 
Landowner. Dominant Landowner argued that the agreement was unenforceable 
because it did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and the terms were too indefinite. 
The court held that the agreement had been taken outside of the Statute of Frauds 
because Servient Landowners completely fulfilled their obligations. Additionally, 
Servient Landowners were free from the restraints and penalties of the Statute of 
Frauds because they substantially relied on Dominant Landowner’s promise to 
convey the piece of land to Servient Landowners. The court also held that the 
agreement was definite enough to be enforced. The court concluded that when 
looking at the agreement and taking into account the intention of the parties, the 
agreement terms could be construed and ascertained with reasonable certainty. This 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 




In re Joseph M. Drago Revocable Tr. Agreement Dated Aug. 11, 1992, No. 
335472, 2018 WL 442219 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018). 
 
The trial court denied Landowner’s request to remove a dock at the end of a private 
road. Landowner appealed, arguing that Lot Owners were “riparian” owners who 
only had a right to build and maintain a dock at water’s edge. The appellate court 
held that the caselaw did not limit private access to water’s edge, but rather 
indicates an intent to allow access into bodies of water. Landowner also argued that 
by allowing overnight mooring of boats, the trial court erred because this would 
constitute unlimited use of the dock, but the appellate court held that the trial court 
never stated that “temporary mooring” included overnight mooring. As to all of 
Landowner’s arguments, because the trial court was not clearly erroneous in its 
interpretation of the caselaw, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 
before citing the case as precedent.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/9





Hudson v. Irwin, 2018 MT 8, 390 Mont. 138, 408 P.3d 1283. 
 
Landowner-1 sued neighboring Landowner-2 for declaratory relief, arguing that 
Landowner-1 was entitled to use an airstrip located on Landowner-2’s property 
pursuant to a prior easement grant. The trial court concluded that Landowner-1’s 
property was not benefitted by an easement to use the airstrip because there was no 
express reservation of the easement in the prior agreement. The Supreme Court of 
Montana affirmed the decision of the lower court but for alternative reasons. The 
court held that Landowner-1 did not have an easement because the agreement only 
allowed for the use of one airplane on the airstrip, and to allow for another 
landowner to use the airstrip would permit more than one airplane to use the 




Royal v. McKee, 905 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 2017). 
 
Property Owner sued Utility District, contending that he should be given fee title 
ownership of a 200-foot right-of-way that went across Property Owner’s property. 
Utility District then filed a counterclaim, arguing that it had acquired ownership via 
adverse possession. Although the trial court held that Utility District had acquired 
an easement in the right-of-way through its predecessor’s eminent domain in 1869, 
the court ultimately ruled that neither Property Owner nor Utility District had 
established the elements of adverse possession necessary to quiet title. The court 
ruled against Utility District’s adverse possession claim because its use of the right-
of-way was not hostile. Giving deference to the lower court’s holding, the court 
ruled against Property Owner’s adverse possession claim because Property Owner 
did not establish the claim in his amended complaint. Because the court found that 
neither party had established adverse possession over the right-of-way, the court 
vacated the trial court’s default against all parties other than Utility District and 
Property Owner.  
 
New Jersey  
 
Xiaofei Wang v. Mei-Yu Tsai, No. A-0171-16T3, 2018 WL 389185 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Jan. 12, 2018).  
 
Landowner and Neighbor owned adjoining properties that were once a part of a 
larger parcel of land. At some point, the land split, and the previous owner sold the 
parcel of land now owned by Neighbor, reserving for themselves the other half of 
the land and a strip of land in between to operate as a right of way, which is now 
owned by Landowner. The right of way appeared in all subsequent deeds. 
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Landowner erected a fence down the middle of the right of way, and Neighbor 
made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to remove the fence. Neighbor sued for a 
declaratory judgement to declare the continued existence of the right of way and 
sought an order to require Landowner to remove fence. The lower court ruled for 
Neighbor, finding that there was no evidence that the interest in the right of way 
had ever been abandoned and that the easement was “available as a general way.” 
On appeal, appellate court affirmed the lower court and held that Neighbor was the 
dominant tenement, and that Landowner did not meet its burden of proof to support 
a finding of abandonment. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, 
state court rules should be consulted before citing to the case as precedent. 
 
New York  
 
Maicus v. Maicus, 156 A.D.3d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).  
 
Landowner-1 appealed a trial court’s order which determined that adjoining 
Landowner-2 possessed a right-of-way to two dirt roads located on Landowner-1’s 
property. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the deeds 
used by Landowner-1 to show a chain of title provided Landowner-1 with actual 
notice that a right-of-way had been reserved by prior landowners. The actual notice 
was evidenced by the language in a deed which reserved access to the two dirt 
roads to “the remaining property owned by” the preceding landowners to 
Landowner-2’s property. 
 
Patel v. Garden Homes Mgmt. Corp., 68 N.Y.S.3d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Landowners’ property was encroached upon by runoff water from Corporation’s 
land, so Landowners sued for trespass to recover damages and an injunction. 
Corporation countered that it had acquired a proscriptive easement over 
Landowners’ property. The trial court rendered judgment for Corporation, finding 
that Corporation had an easement that precluded Landowners’ cause of action. The 
appellate court reversed and remanded because: (1) Corporation’s use of 
Landowners’ property was not proven to be continuous by clear and convincing 
evidence and therefore it had no proscriptive easement, and (2) the trespass to 
Landowners’ property was continuous so their action was not time-barred. 
 
North Carolina  
 
Turnage v. Cunningham, 808 S.E.2d 619 (Table) (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). 
 
Landowners owned a landlocked tract, so they filed for an easement by necessity 
through Neighbors’ property. The predecessors in interest to Landowners filed a 
Petition for Cartway through Neighbors’ land, which was denied. Landowners won 
the easement at trial on a summary judgment motion, so Neighbors argued on 
appeal that any implied easement that Landowners’ predecessors in title acquired 
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had been abandoned long since and any implied easement owned by Landowners’ 
or their predecessors had been adversely possessed by Neighbors. The appellate 
court affirmed because no easement was abandoned because it was only recently 
granted and no easement could have been adversely possessed for the same reason. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 




Blanton v. Eskridge, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3783, 2017 WL 6371730 (Dec. 
11, 2017). 
 
Landowner lived on land that had been landlocked since 1962. The state had built a 
limited access entrance to Landowner’s land from State Route 52 across the land 
eventually owned by Neighbor. Landowner had lived on the land for less than a 
year when he received a cease and desist letter from Neighbor concerning his use 
of the private roadway. Landowner filed a complaint claiming both a prescriptive 
and a necessity easement. After the trial, Landowner dropped his prescriptive 
easement claim and proceeded with only the necessity easement claim; the trial 
court ruled in favor of Landowner. Neighbor appealed. The appellate court 
determined that “[p]rior unity of ownership of both the dominant and servient 
estate [was] the sine qua non for establishing an easement by necessity.” The court 
noted that Landowner never established such prior unity of title and also failed to 
prove that his land was landlocked when originally subdivided. Because 
Landowner did not meet the requirements for an easement by necessity, the court 
reversed the lower court’s decision. 
 
Bd. of Dirs., Maumee Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Army, 3rd Dist. Van Wert 
NO. 15-17-09, 2017 WL 6450822 (Dec. 18, 2017). 
 
Water conservation district (“District”) obtained land right easement from 
Landowners in 1994. District learned in 2012 that Landowners had sold the 
property to Trustees, who had plans to develop the property subject to the 
easement. In 2016, District was made aware that Trustees had cut down trees and 
drained a pond, exceeding the limits placed upon the property by the easement. 
District brought action against Trustees, and the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of District. On appeal, Trustees asserted that trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment, but the appellate court held that summary judgment 
was appropriate because no genuine issue of fact existed as to the issues of the 
permanent injunction, damages, and imposed fine. Additionally, the court found 
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its denial of Trustees 
counterclaim and request for continuance. Accordingly, the appellate court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court.  
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City of Sidney v. Spring Creek Corp., 3rd Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-07, 2017 WL 
5989073 (Dec. 4 2017).  
 
Corporation appealed lower court’s decision granting summary judgment for City 
in a dispute regarding control over an aquifer below Corporation’s property. 
Corporation was landowner of the two subject parcels, holding a conservation 
easement for use of the water from the aquifer below said parcels. The conservation 
easement was only in place after negotiations for the sale of the property from 
Corporation to City fell through. Afterward, City sought fee simple title to the 
subject property and the related groundwater from the underlying aquifer below. 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of the City because it 
determined that the easement in question could not be considered a conservation 
easement, despite the Tribe’s assertion. This is because the easement language did 
not reflect an effort to preserve the land from physical change or development. 
Instead, although the underlying aquifer was meant to remain intact, by the 
easement terms the surface land is allowed and intended to be drastically altered. 
Furthermore, the court agreed with City’s finding that the conservation easement 
went against public policy and state law. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower 




Bartkowski v. Ramondo, Nos. 432 EDA 2017, 521 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 495213 
(Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018). 
 
Servient Owner had constructed a driveway with the permission of the previous 
dominant property’s owner to access its own property. Dominant Owner sued 
Servient Owner for trespass and ejectment after Dominant Owner acquired the 
property. Servient Owner argued that it had either acquired the property underlying 
the driveway via adverse possession or that it had an easement by either 
prescription, necessity, or implication. The trial court found that the Servient 
Owner had an easement by prescription and dismissed the other claims. Dominant 
Owner appealed. Additionally, Servient Owner challenged the trial court’s lack of 
finding of an easement by necessity and its failure to grant Servient Owner title to 
the driveway’s land under the doctrine of consentable line. On appeal, the court 
found that the trial court erred by finding that the Servient Owner had a prescriptive 
easement because the trial court incorrectly determined that there was unity of 
ownership before separation of the parcels creating the basis for the easement. 
However, the court agreed with the trial court in finding there was no easement by 
necessity because difficulty and expense did not equate with impossibility. Lastly, 
in dealing with the issue of the doctrine of consentable line, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s finding to not grant the Servient Owner the property underlying the 
driveway, holding the driveway was not running along a boundary of the properties 
but was fully within the Dominant Owner’s property. This is an unpublished 
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opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be followed before citing 
the case as precedent.  
 
Imhoff v. Deemer, No. 303 WDA, 2017, WL 6330801 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 
2017). 
 
Landowner and Neighbor own adjacent properties. Neighbor obtained a building 
permit to construct a barn on their property. They also obtained permits to construct 
a riding area for their horses. A year later, heavy rainfall came that caused huge 
amounts of water, soil, and debris to flow from Neighbor’s property onto 
Landowner’s. Neighbor constructed a split fence along the property line. 
Landowner filed a complaint alleging private nuisance. At a bench trial, the trial 
court issued an order in favor of Neighbor. Landowner applied arguing that the 
barn and riding area needed to be set back 150 feet because they were “structures 
for animal raising and care.” The appellate court found that Landowner failed to 
prove that Neighbor lacked in meeting the 150-foot requirement. This was because 
Landowner did not provide evidence of how the fixtures failed to be 150 feet away 
from the property line. The court also rejected the issue of Landowner’s claiming 
that Neighbor had a responsibility regarding the heavy rainfall causing debris to 
come on Landowner’s land. The court noted that owners do become liable for 
damage that is caused by natural discharge when they alter the natural conditions to 
change the flow of the water. In this case, Landowner’s actions were not enough to 
constitute an alteration that changed where the water flowed. Therefore, the court 
upheld the trial courts order in favor of Neighbor. This is an unpublished opinion of 
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as 
precedent.  
 
Plows v. Roles, No. 631 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 494775 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 
2018). 
 
Landowner-1 appealed a trial court’s judgment that granted Landowner-2 the right 
to install a sewage line through Landowner-1’s property. The court affirmed the 
decision of the lower court, reasoning that the use of the easement listed in 
Landowner-1’s deed provided Landowner-2 with the right to construct a sewage 
line through Landowner-1’s property. Further, the court reasoned that there were 
no limitations on the ability of Landowner-2 to use the easement for ingress or 
egress; thus, the installation of a sewer line would be proper to make Landowner-
2’s property livable. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state 
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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Thomas A. Robinson Family Ltd. P’ship v. Bioni, 178 A. 3d. 839 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017). 
 
Company sued Landowner after Landowner installed a large steel post on his 
sidewalk that prevented Company from accessing public roads with its large paving 
vehicles. Company claimed that through years of continuous use by itself and its 
predecessor, they had a prescriptive use to the two feet of “sidewalk” that ran 
across Landowner’s property. Trial court found in favor of Company and that both 
Company and the public had a prescriptive easement to the sidewalk. The appellate 
court affirmed that Company had met the twenty-one-year continuous and 
uninterrupted use element of a prescriptive easement. Although Company had only 
been in business for twenty years at the time of the lawsuit, the use of Company’s 
predecessors of the easement was sufficient to meet the twenty-one-year 
requirement. However, the court vacated the portion of the trial court’s finding that 
the general public has the right to traverse Landowner’s property. No claim to a 
public prescriptive easement was made in this case, no claim was made to the 
public easement at trial, and Company did not argue in defense of a public 




Bujnoch v. Copano Energy, LLC, No. 13-15-00621-CV, 2017 WL 6616741 (Tex. 
Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017). 
 
Landowner gave Energy Company a thirty-foot wide easement for the construction 
and maintenance of a pipeline. Subsequently, Energy Company approached 
Landowner again asking for another easement for a second gas line, which 
Landowner granted. Energy Company’s attorney then sent e-mails to Landowner 
stating that Energy Company would pay $70 per foot of the pipeline, to which 
Landowner agreed. However, Landowner later received written letters from a 
different Energy Company representative stating that it would only be paying $20 
to $40 per foot of the second pipeline. Landowner then brought a breach of contract 
claim and a tortious interference claim against Energy Company. The trial court 
found in favor of Energy Company and granted summary judgment on both the 
breach of contract claim and the tortious interference claim. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s findings on the breach of contract claim, holding instead 
in favor of Landowner. It reasoned that there was a breach of contract because the 
emails sent to Landowner included essential terms and could be read together so as 
to satisfy the statute of frauds. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s 









Hall v. Peterson, 2017 UT App 226, 409 P.3d 133. 
 
Landowner denied Neighbor access to a dirt road Neighbor claimed to be the only 
way to access another road leading to Neighbors land. Neighbor sued, arguing that 
an easement by estoppel was created on the dirt road, and thus, he was entitled to 
use of the road. A jury found sufficient evidence to support an easement by 
estoppel. Landowner appealed, arguing that there was not enough evidence to 
support a finding of an easement, and thus, the trial court erred when it denied 
Landowner’s motion for a directed verdict. appellate court held that because 
easement by estoppel has never been recognized by the state, the elements under 
the restatement definition, which requires: (1) permission to use, (2) reasonable 
foreseeability of reliance by user, and (3) a substantial change of position by user 
and these elements, were questions of fact for the jury. It further held that the 
evidence was not sufficient to prove estoppel because there was no evidence that 
the dirt road was ever used by a predecessor in title and, regardless, it was not 
pervasive enough to give notice to Landowner. Thus, the court found that it was not 
reasonable to deduce reliance from Landowner’s silence to Neighbor’s use of the 
dirt road and that Neighbor failed to provide any evidence of actual reliance. 
Because Neighbor failed to meet all the requirements of easement by estoppel, the 




Campbell v. Vill. of DeForest, No. 2017AP601, 2017 WL 6398534 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Dec. 14, 2017). 
 
Property Owner (“Owner”) purchased certain property in 1999. Owner knew that 
the property was burdened by a public pedestrian and bicycle easement, which was 
subject to both use by the general public of the Village and to management and 
improvement by the Village itself. In 2015, the Village constructed a raised 
boardwalk within the easement for the use of walkers and cyclists. Owner filed a 
petition for inverse condemnation seeking compensation for loss of ability to use 
the part of her land that was subject to the easement. The court agreed that the 
boardwalk created a barrier preventing her use; however, it also determined that the 
Village’s design of the boardwalk was fully within its broad rights under the 
easement’s language and concluded that no taking occurred. Thus, Owner’s claim 
was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The court 
echoed the sentiment of the lower court, stating that the easement agreement was 
very broad, and that the Village did not exceed the thirty feet allowed for the 
easement. The court also noted that the point of an easement is that the “[Owner’s] 
right to freely use her property must succumb to the Village’s use and enjoyment of 
the easement.” This is an unpublished opinion; therefore; state court rules should 
be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
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Fankhauser v. Fankhauser, No. 2017AP776, 2018 WL 565854 (Wis. Ct. App. 
January 25, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued Neighbor after Neighbor obstructed Landowner’s access to his 
property by blocking an easement. Landowner argued that the parties had 
negotiated an end to the lawsuit, but Neighbor refused to sign two documents 
necessary to complete the agreement. Landowner argued that the negotiations 
constituted a binding settlement agreement. Trial court held that the parties had 
reached an “agreement in principle” and that the terms were therefore enforceable. 
On appeal, the court adopted the “formal contract doctrine” under Wisconsin law, 
in which where parties negotiate and contemplate signed documents as necessary to 
complete the agreement, the parties are only bound by those documents if they are 
signed. The court also noted that because the negotiations included the conveyance 
of an easement that was required to be recorded with the County Register of Deeds; 
one of the formal requirements under State law for a conveyance is that the 
instrument is to be signed by both parties. This was further evidence that the parties 
intended the affidavit to be in writing. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court, 
and concluded that no binding agreement existed between the two parties. This is 
an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 
before citing the case as precedent.  
 




Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 880 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 
Company signed a lease with City allowing Company to collect gasses emanating 
from City’s landfill to be converted into electricity. A provision in the lease stated 
that upon termination of the contract, City had the right to “retain all ‘structures’ 
and ‘below-grade installations and/or improvements.’” Eventually, the lease was 
terminated and City kept the property. Later, though, Company filed for bankruptcy 
and refinanced in such a way that creditor claimed a lien on the property in dispute. 
Creditor then sued City, claiming a right to the property in dispute because of its 
lien after Company defaulted on their agreement with creditor. The lower court, 
however, found that City’s claim to the property in dispute should prevail because 
Creditor “could not have obtained any rights greater than those held by [Company] 
even with” its interest acquired through bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the lower court, finding that City’s claim to the property should 
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9th Circuit  
 
Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir 2017).  
 
The United States’ Forest Service (“USFS”) restricted certain land near the Grand 
Canyon from mining practices, but this restriction did not apply to existing mining 
rights of Companies. USFS determined that Companies had a preexisting right to 
mine, so were not prevented by the land designation. The court held that USFS’s 
action was final because it was a “practical requirement” for continued mining by 
Companies, and they were aware of its importance. Additionally, the court held 
that the lower court was correct in its unfavorable determination of the merits of 
Tribe’s claim for several reasons. First, the court held that the Mineral Report 
issued was a federal action, and no further environmental impact studies were 
required under NEPA because this decision was a follow-up to a temporary halt in 
a previously approved operation, so no changes to the operations were intended. 
Second, the Mineral Report was found to be an “undertaking” under NHPA only to 
the extent that it “acknowledged the continued vitality of the original approval” for 
mining. Therefore, the court found that no other evaluation was needed for this 
acknowledgement. Information on the property’s historic preservation status was 
not introduced by the earlier approval because it was not yet applicable for this 
property, and Tribe asserted that such information should have been introduced 
later, when it was available. However, the court held that this requirement was 
eliminated by a revision to the pertinent statute. Therefore, no “continuing 
obligation” to reevaluate later in the process was no longer imposed. The court also 
held that Tribe asked for more stringent evaluation and remedies than could legally 
be provided by the NHPA and that the legislation that was the basis for Tribe’s 
claims was not in place to protect private property interests, so Tribe had no 




Gentili v. Town of Sturbridge, 15 MISC 000570, 2018 WL 446353 (Mass. Land Ct. 
Jan. 10, 2018). 
 
The facts of this case took place over a period of over sixty years. About twenty 
years before Trust brought this action against Town, Trust decided it wanted to 
make adjustments to a property road. It observed nearby drainage structures so it 
asked the town conservation commission (“Commission”) if the road was subject 
to state wetlands regulation. Commission told Trust it was not, but then six years 
later Commission said it found a clearly observable stream running across the 
property and forming a wetland. Any developments Trust made would thus be 
subject to the state’s wetlands regulatory act. Trust brought an action against Town 
for discharging stormwater onto its property. It argued that Town had no 
prescriptive easement or other right to discharge water onto its property, which 
discharge was creating the wetlands. The court held that decades before Trust 
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brought this action, Town had already acquired the right to discharge stormwater 
onto Trust’s property because it was collecting and discharging surface water 
continuously, openly and adversely under a claim of right, on Trust’s property, for 
more than twenty years. Town satisfied the requirements to gain a right or 




Cappel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 905 N.W.2d 38 (Neb. 2017). 
 
Property Owners sued the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) for 
claims of inverse condemnation, public health and welfare, due process, and 
restitution. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Property Owners 
had failed to state a claim on the count of inverse condemnation. Property Owners 
appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court first held that Property Owners’ public 
health and welfare claims should have been barred for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because the claims were being made against a state, which held 
sovereign immunity against them. The court then found that the district court 
correctly determined that Property Owners had failed to articulate a compensable 
private property right in their claim for inverse condemnation, because the relevant 
authority holds that water is a public resource, and the manner in which DNR 
regulated it did not constitute a physical or regulatory taking required for a 
compensable claim of inverse condemnation. Finally, the court held that Property 
Owners’ final two claims must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because: (1) due process violations fail to create independent causes of 
action seeking monetary damages, meaning Property Owners’ sole remedy was the 
public health and welfare claims already discussed, and (2) Property Owners did 
not follow either of the procedures that the Nebraska legislature has provided to 
allow suits for restitution against the state, so sovereign immunity still applied. 
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Property Owners’ 
inverse condemnation claim and remanded the issue with instructions for the lower 
court to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   
 
New York  
 
Matter of City of N.Y., (CY) 4018/07, 2018 WL 413750 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 
2018). 
 
In this condemnation proceeding, the court analyzed the compensation owed to 
Landowner for the property taking done by City. The property was regulated as 
wetlands, so development was unlikely, if not impossible. Landowner had 
purchased the already wetland designated property at a foreclosure sale. The main 
issue was calculating the value of the property. Typically, wetland properties are 
valued based upon their use as restricted by the regulation. However, there is an 
exception if Landowner establishes that the regulation on the property is a 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/9
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regulatory taking. If Landowner establishes the regulation as a taking, the property 
value calculation would be based upon the current value of the property as 
regulated plus an added amount that a subsequent purchaser may pay for the 
property for the possibility of successful litigation to deregulate the property. The 
court first determined whether the fact that Landowner purchased the property after 
the wetland regulation precluded him from challenging the wetland regulations and 
found that it did not. The court then determined whether a successful challenge to 
the wetland regulations on the property could be undertaken to warrant an increase 
in the value of the property. The court first concluded that the regulations deemed 
the property useless for economic reasons and removed all but a minor residual 
value for the property. Therefore, the court assigned a value to the property with 
the added value of potential successful deregulation. This amount was established 
by experts and analysis by the court through reviewing what amount of the 
difference of the unregulated value of the property, minus costs for deregulation 
litigation, and regulated value of the property should be added to the condemnation 
value. 
 
Troy Sand & Gravel Co. v. Fleming, 156 A.D.3d 1295 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 
Operator applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation for a mining 
permit to operate an open pit, hard rock quarry. Operator’s plans for the land, 
which was located within a rural residential area, required the blasting of solid rock 
formations. Commercial excavation was permitted in this district subject to the 
procurement of a special use permit; the Town Board (“Board”) denied Operator’s 
application for the permit. Operator brought suit seeking to annul the Board’s 
denial. First, Operator argued that the Board violated an agreement between the 
parties to review the application under a local law, which required a special use 
permit application be subject to a public hearing. Operator claimed the Board 
violated this agreement when it held its own public hearing separate from the initial 
hearing and it accepted additional environmental information beyond the initial 
Environment Impact Statement (“EIS”). Operator further claimed that the Board’s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not rely on the EIS. The court 
held that the deviations from the agreement did not violate any local law, nor did 
such deviations violate the agreement itself. The court further held that Board’s 
denial of Operator’s permit application “properly found its rationale in the EIC.” 
Finally, the court rejected Operator’s contention that the Board’s decision was an 
error due to conflicts of interest and bias of members of the Board, holding that 
these claims of conflict and bias lacked merit. For these reasons, the New York 
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Little River, LLC v. Lee Cty., 809 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Miner applied for a special use permit to develop an aggregate rock quarry in an 
area zoned primarily for residential agriculture but that allowed quarry 
development. After multiple public hearings, County denied Miner a special use 
permit, claiming Miner failed to meet the permit requirements, namely, that the 
quarry would not adversely affect public health, safety, and neighboring property 
values, that all conditions of the permit were met, and that the quarry could be 
developed in harmony with the surrounded area. Miner appealed County’s decision 
to the court which upheld County’s denial. Miner then appealed the lower court’s 
decision. The appellate court found that Miner adequately presented evidence to 
meet the aforementioned requirements of a special use permit for the quarry and 
that County was incorrect in finding that the requirements were not met. 
Additionally, the court found that County’s reasons for denial were not supported 
by material and substantial evidence and that the lower court was incorrect in its 
review of the evidence and subsequent affirmation of County’s decision. Therefore, 
the court remanded the issue for County to reconsider Miner’s application for a 




Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Pennington Cty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 2017 S.D. 87, 905 
N.W.2d 344. 
 
County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) appealed the circuit court’s decision to 
grant Company a construction permit to expand its mining operations into land 
controlled by the County Zoning Ordinance (“CZO”). The Supreme Court of South 
Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant the construction permit, 
finding that CZO demanded that any extraction of any substance exceeding 100 
cubic yards required a mining permit. Furthermore, the statute’s language was so 
unambiguous that the city’s interpretation of the CZO was not entitled to any 
deference from the court. Finally, even though Company’s operations predated the 
CZO, the fact that it sought to expand its operation into areas not previously used 




Movrich v. Lobermeier, 905 N.W.2d 807 (Wash. 2018). 
 
Property Owners, whose property is located upland from a creek, sued waterbed 
property owners (“WB Owners”), asserting a right to access flowage from the 
creek and to install a pier directly from Property Owner’s property. The district 
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court granted summary judgment for Private Owners and WB Owners appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Washington. Three issues were presented in the case: (1) 
whether Property Owners have riparian rights, and, when combined with their 
rights under the public trust doctrine, those rights become superior to WB Owners’ 
property rights; (2) whether the public trust doctrine grants WB Owners the right to 
install a pier from over the portion that is privately held; and (3) whether the public 
trust doctrine requires Property Owners to access the flowage from a public access 
point. First, the court held that Property Owners did not hold rights superior to WB 
Owners and that Property Owners may enjoy the flowage in ways consistent with 
WB Owners’ rights. Second, the court held that “the public trust doctrine conveys 
no private property rights, regardless of the presence of navigable water.” Lastly, 
the court held that the public trust doctrine allows Property Owners to access the 
flowage from their private property so long as they use the flowage in ways 
consistent with the doctrine. 
 
Verjee-Van v. Pierce Cty., No. 48947-3-II, 2017 WL 6603662 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2017).  
 
Landowner claimed both that Neighbor-1’s pier was improperly constructed and 
that Neighbor-2’s fence was improperly placed according to local zoning laws, so 
she filed complaints to County to have them removed. County deemed both to be in 
accordance with the laws, and Landowner did not appeal its decision. Instead, 
Landowner filed a writ of mandamus to force County to remove the complained-of 
property features. The trial court found that mandamus was inappropriate and 
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court affirmed and held that mandamus 
was inappropriate because Landowner had failed to appeal County’s decision to 
administrative authorities and also because Landowner would have had a “plain, 
speedy, and adequate” remedy at law if her case was meritorious. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 
before citing the case as precedent. 
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Traditional Generation  
 
E.D. Kentucky  
 
Kentucky Waterways All. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., No. 5:17-292-DCR, 2017 WL 
6628917 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization sued Utility Company (“Company”) for violating the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”). The CWA claim alleged that Company’s actions in disposing of waste 
from its coal-powered generating plant constituted pollution of navigable water 
without a permit, and the RCRA claim alleged that Company’s “handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid waste” at the station could provide for 
“imminent and substantial endangerment” both to human health and to the 
environment in the community. Company moved to dismiss Environmental 
Organization’s claims. The district court granted Company’s Motion in regards to 
the RCRA claim for lack of standing. The court also granted Company’s motion to 
dismiss the CWA claims by refusing to adopt any theory that pollution that 
groundwaters would eventually flow into navigable waters fell under the reach of 
the CWA and its permitting requirement. For those reasons, both claims brought by 
Environmental Organization were dismissed. This case has since been appealed, 




In re Application of Maui Electric Co., 408 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2017). 
 
Environmental Organization filed a motion to intervene in Utility Company’s 
(“Company”) application with Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) to approve a 
power purchase agreement. PUC ultimately denied the motion, and the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii granted Environmental Organization’s writ of certiorari, which 
presented the issue of whether due process under Hawaii’s Constitution included 
protections for individuals “asserting the constitutional right to a clean and 
healthful environment.” The court determined that Environmental Organization’s 
claim fit within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and allowed 
the case to move forward. In order to have a due process claim, Environmental 
Organization must have a property interest at stake. The court determined that state 
law relating to environmental quality should be interpreted to establish such a right 
in Environmental Organization’s interest in a “clean and healthful environment.” 
The court further held that because of its due process rights, Environmental 
Organization was entitled to a hearing by PUC to evaluate any impacts of 
Company’s application on Environmental Organization’s right to a “clean and 
healthful environment.” Finally, the court held that Environmental Organization 
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had standing. For those reasons, the court held that Environmental Organization 
was entitled to a due process hearing by PUC in order to protect its guaranteed 
“property right to a clean and healthful environment,” and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 
 




Exelon Generation Acquisitions, LLC v. Deere & Co., 176 A.3d 1262 (Del. 2017). 
 
Wind farm seller (“Seller”) sued wind farm buyer (“Buyer”), arguing that Buyer 
had breached the Purchase Power Agreement. The Purchase Agreement contained 
an earn-out provision that could be triggered if Seller reached prescribed goals 
related to wind farm projects already under development when the sale occurred. 
Following the sale from Seller, Buyer acquired an additional site from an unrelated 
party after a nearby site purchased from Seller was blocked due to civic opposition. 
Because the site purchased from an unrelated party was financially successful, 
Seller argued that the earn-out provision had been triggered by a “Power Purchase 
Agreement” on the grounds that Buyer had simply relocated the unsuccessful wind 
farm to the new site acquired from the unrelated party. Reversing the lower court’s 
summary judgment in favor of Seller, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the 
earn-out provision had not been triggered because the term “wind project” in 
relation to the “Power Purchase Agreement” contained a geographical 




Hilo Project, LLC v. County of Hawai'i Windward Plan. Comm’n, 409 P.3d 784 
(Table) (Haw. Ct. App. 2018). 
 
Adjacent Property Owners appealed the appellate court’s decision to uphold the 
approval of Operator's Special Management Area ("SMA") permit to convert a 
coal-burning power plant into a renewable electrical power generation facility. The 
appellate court held the public trust doctrine as inapplicable because the State of 
Hawai’i does not have ownership of the land at issue. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Hawai’i, Property Owners argued that approval of the SMA permit will 
have a negative environmental impact and that the public trust doctrine was 
misapplied by the appellate court. The Supreme Court of Hawai’i affirmed in part 
and remanded in part on the issue of the application of the public trust doctrine. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
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In re Order Approving Application by DG Minn. CSG 2, LLC, Case No. A17–
0099, 2017 WL 6567653 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2017).  
 
Landowners appealed County’s decision to grant a conditional use permit (“CUP”) 
for a third party to construct a solar farm. The court determined that the County’s 
decision would stand unless the entity acted “unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 
capriciously.” The court affirmed the decision of County to grant the CUP because 
it reasonably interpreted its zoning ordinance to allow for a solar farm to stand as a 
conditional use. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court 
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
New Jersey  
 
Minnesota Solar, LLC v. Carver Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, A17–0504, 2017 WL 
6418179 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2017).  
 
Producer applied for a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to construct and operate a 
large solar farm. County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) denied Producer’s 
CUP. Producer appealed, claiming that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, 
capricious, and unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed Board’s decision for 
several reasons. First, Board’s denial of the CUP was legally sufficient for the 
stated reasons of “health, safety, and welfare of the community.” Second, the 
record supported the reasons for the Board’s denial of the CUP. Third, Producer 
could not establish that a violation of its equal protection rights occurred because it 
failed to show that “similarly situated persons have been treated differently.” This 
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be 
consulted before citing the case as precedent.   
 
North Carolina  
 
Ecoplexus Inc. v. Cty. of Currituck, 809 S.E.2d 148 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
 
Developer applied for a permit to use property owned by City to build a solar farm. 
After finding that Developer’s proposed solar farm would be dangerous to public 
safety or health, would not “be in harmony with the surrounding area,” and would 
fail to conform to the 2006 Land Use Plan, the county board of commissioners 
(“Board”) denied Developer’s application. Developer appealed Board’s decision to 
the trial court, which upheld the order. The appellate court held that the denial of 
Developer’s permit was inappropriate because Developer was able to make a prima 
facie showing that it was entitled to the permit, and opponents to the permit did not 
present evidence sufficient to overcome that showing. The court held that Board 
“relied on generalized lay concerns, speculation, and ‘mere expression of opinion’” 
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to deny Developer’s application rather than requiring the level of evidence needed 
to rebut Developer’s prima facie showing that it was entitled to the permit. The 




D.C. Circuit  
 
Ameren Servs. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 880 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir. 
2018). 
 
Transmission Company brought this suit against Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) after FERC issued orders allowing incoming Midcontinent 
Independent System Operator (“MISO”) generators to bring in new sources of 
power, connect them to the existing grid, and self-fund the new construction 
regardless of current grid owners’ interests. Transmission Company argued that 
involuntary generator funding would force it to have to construct and operate its 
facilities without any returns, as if it was a non-profit manager of the facilities. It 
would have to take on costs that it would never recoup. FERC argued that it would 
be unjust and discriminatory to deprive an interconnection customer of the ability 
to self-fund. The court remanded the case based on this issue, holding that FERC 
failed to fully consider Transmission Company’s arguments and that its potential-




Else v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, No. 1 CA-CV 17-0208, 2018 WL 542924 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2018). 
 
Landowner sued the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”) in regard 
to its approval of Operator’s proposed transmission line project. Landowner 
contended that, while Operator argued the project would “create[ ] access to 
stranded renewable [energy] resources,” the actual project could be substantially 
different from Operator’s proposed project. Additionally, Landowner argues that 
there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to grant approval of the project. 
Because Landowner failed to meet the burden of proof in demonstrating that the 
Commission’s grant was either “unreasonable or unlawful,” the appellate court 
upheld the lower court’s affirmation of the grant of a Certificate of Environmental 
Compatibility by Commission.  
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South Dakota  
 
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Parkshill Farms, LLC, 2017 SD 88, 905 N.W.2d 
334.  
 
Utilities Company (“Company”) sought to construct transmission line across 
several miles of land. After unsuccessful negotiations with Landowners to obtain 
easements, Company filed petition for condemnation. The trial court granted the 
petition, and a jury awarded Landowners just compensation for the easements. 
Landowners appealed based on three issues: (1) the easements were not taken for 
public use; (2) the easements were not necessary; and (3) the trial court erred in 
refusing Landowner’s requested jury instruction for compensation of damages. The 
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the easements were for public use 
because Company is required by law to provide service to the general public. 
Additionally, the court held that the easements were necessary and Company did 
not abuse its discretion because the easements’ uses were limited in purpose, 
instead of for all uses. Finally, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial 
because the jury instructions did not adequately account for other rights acquired 






California Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d 966 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 
Public Utilities Commission petitioned for a determination on the validity of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) finding that Gas and Electric 
Company (“Company”) was eligible for an “incentive adder.” The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that FERC’s determination that Company was eligible for an 
incentive adder was arbitrary and capricious because FERC determined that 
Company was eligible due to its membership in a regional transmission 
organization, even though such membership was mandated by state law. Therefore, 
FERC’s interpretation of Order 679, which was created to incentivize utility 
companies to join regional transmission organizations, was plainly erroneous. The 
court reasoned that the language of Order 679 implied that “an incentive cannot 
‘induce’ behavior that is already legally mandated.” Moreover, the language of the 
Order suggested that ongoing membership in a regional transmission organization 
was not sufficient alone to justify eligibility for an incentive adder. Without a more 
reasoned explanation by FERC, Company was not entitled to an incentive adder. 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Bankruptcy 
 
W.D. Texas  
 
In re Primera Energy, LLC, 579 B.R. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2017). 
 
Investors brought action against debtor Oil and Gas Companies (“Companies”), 
asserting claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Companies, in response, 
contend that Investors failed to adequately asserted a cause of action, and 
moreover, no fiduciary relationship between the parties existed, nor did Companies 
partake in any instances of fraudulent behavior. Based on the evidence presented, 
the Bankruptcy Court held that under Texas state law, Investors’ fraud claims were 
not precluded based on oral representations, members could be held individually 
liable for fraudulent acts of debtor Companies, and Companies’ representations that 
they would use Investor’s funds as provided in relevant contracts was material in 
support of claims of fraud. Further, because the transaction involved real property 
interests, the first element for a cause of action for statutory fraud in a real estate 
transaction was satisfied. Moreover, Investors’ negligent misrepresentation claims 
were supported by showing that Companies did not exercise reasonable care when 
obtaining and communicating false information. Additionally, evidence showed 
that the transfer of investment funds was done with intent to hinder, delay, and 
defraud investors. Thus, Investors were entitled actual damages of the value of their 
investments. 
 
Other Issues  
 
Fifth Circuit  
 
WBH Energy, L.P. v. CL III Funding Holding, Co., 708 F. App’x 210 (Mem) (5th 
Cir. Jan. 10 2018). 
 
In September 2011, a Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) was formed between the 
Corporation, Debtor Company-1, and Debtor Company-2. The JOA stipulated that 
in the event of any legal proceeding between any of the parties, the prevailing party 
would be entitled to all reasonable attorneys’ fees from the opposing party. Based 
on four previous legal actions, Corporation claimed entitlement to attorneys’ fees 
thereunder. However, the lower court found that all of these proceedings were 
brought seeking temporary injunctive relief and not to enforce a “financial 
obligation” as required by the language of the JOA, thus denying the attorney’s 
fees. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed. 
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D. Kansas  
 
Energy Intelligence Grp., Inc. v. CHS McPherson Ref., Inc., No. 16-01015-EFM-
GLR, 2018 WL 447730 (D. Kan. Jan. 1, 2018). 
 
Company-1 published newsletters and distributed them to subscribers. Company-1 
tried registering Oil Daily with the United States Copyright Office for twelve years. 
Company-2 was a subscriber to Oil Daily for over twenty years and Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly for over thirty; it would receive the publications in print and 
then distribute them to executives throughout the office. Once Company-1 went 
digital with its publications, Company-2 continued to distribute them via email. 
Company-1 sued Company-2 for infringing the copyrights of its publications, and 
Company-2 denied the infringement and filed a motion to refer the matter to the 
Register of Copyrights, arguing that Company-1’s copyright registrations were not 
valid because it allegedly made known misrepresentations to the United States 
Copyright Office when registering for the Oil Daily publications. The court denied 
Company-2’s motion, concluding that Company-1 did not provide inaccurate 
information to the United States Copyright Office when it went to register Oil 
Daily. The court noted that even if it assumed inaccurate information was provided, 




City of Birmingham Ret.& Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017). 
 
Several Environmental Groups brought an action against Corporation, an energy 
company based in North Carolina, under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) for the 
release of coal and ash into the lakes in North Carolina. CWA says that without a 
permit by the EPA, discharge of pollution is unlawful. The North Carolina 
environmental group and Corporation negotiated a consent decree where 
Corporation would pay a fine and complete a compliance schedule. Corporation 
never completed an investigation of the pipe. Some investigation indicated that if 
Corporation had conducted an inspection of the pipe, it would have detected the 
corroded pipe. The Stockholders of Corporation filed a suit after a storm water pipe 
ruptured. The rupture caused coal and ash to go into the River. Corporation plead 
guilty to several criminal misdemeanor violations. Some Stockholders of the 
Corporation filed a suit against the directors and officers. The directors moved for 
dismissal of the claim alleging that the Stockholders were required to make a 
demand on the board of directors before pursuing litigation. The trial court agreed 
with the Directors that in order for the Stockholders to hold the directors personally 
liable for a Caremark violation they first needed to show the directors intentionally 
breached their fiduciary duty and -rose to the occasion of bad faith. The Supreme 
Court of Delaware upheld the trial court’s decision and found that the stockholders 
were required to first make a demand to the directors before pursuing litigation.  
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North Carolina  
 
Continental Res., Inc. v. P&P Indus., LLC I, 2018 ND 11, 906 N.W.2d 1.  
 
Producer sued Service Provider for breach of contract, tortious interference, and 
fraud and deceit, claiming that Service Provider improperly billed Producer for 
transportation and water hauling services. Service Provider counterclaimed, 
seeking damages for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and promissory estoppel. The trial court granted 
summary judgment on Service Provider’s breach of fiduciary duty and constructive 
fraud counterclaims. A jury found for Producer on its claims of fraud and deceit 
and found in favor of Service Provider on its claims of fraud, deceit, and breach of 
contract. However, while the court ordered damages to be paid to Producer on its 
prevailing claims, it provided neither damages nor relief for Service Provider, and 
excused Producer from performing the breached contract. Service Provider 
motioned the court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, 
but both motions were denied. Service Provider appealed, claiming that the lower 
court erred when it denied its motions arguing that it is entitled to recover damages 
for the value of materials and services it provided in the contract breached by 
Producer as well as the value of its destroyed business. The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that the jury’s 
finding that Producer was excused from performing the contract it breached due to 
Service Provider’s prior material breach was inconsistent and perverse and could 
not be reconciled by law, and Service Provider was only entitled to the net profits it 




Kinnear Rd. Redevelopment, L.L.C. v. Testa, 151 Ohio St.3d 540, 2017-Ohio-8816, 
90 N.E.3d 926.  
 
Tax Commissioner (“Commissioner”) challenged the Board of Tax Appeals’ 
(“Board”) finding that Developer was entitled to a tax exemption under state law. 
The exemption, also known as the “brownfield exemption,” was created for 
developers who remediated a hazardous-waste contaminated property and provided 
a tax break for the developers based upon the increase in market value of the 
property upon remediation. Developer remediated a vacant and contaminated 
property and constructed an apartment building on the land. Commissioner granted 
an exemption for the increase in property value based upon the remediated land but 
did not provide an exemption for the increase in property value due to the newly 
constructed apartment building as Commissioner felt it was not covered under the 
statute. Board disagreed with Commissioner and found that Developer should have 
been granted an exemption based on both the remediation and the improvements. 
Based on the plain language of the statute, the court agreed with Board’s 
conclusion that the exemption applies to the land and improvements. The court also 
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concluded that Commissioner’s argument that the timing of the construction of the 
improvements and the time of the tax assessment prevented the improvements 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
9th Circuit  
 
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 
Miners challenged the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) decision to temporarily 
withdraw, under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“Act”), over one-
million acres of federal land around the Grand Canyon from any new uranium 
mining claims for the maximum period allowed – twenty years – in order to protect 
the land from potential uranium contamination in the surrounding environment and 
groundwater. The Act imposed on DOI a twenty-year limitation on withdrawals, 
issuance of a report to Congress detailing the statutory requirement, and the 
possibility that Congress may veto DOI’s withdrawal; the Act also contained a 
severability clause. The district court upheld DOI’s decision to withdraw the lands. 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the congressional veto 
provision was unconstitutional, but because of the severability clause it did not 
affect DOI’s ability to withdraw federal lands. Regarding Miners’ challenge to 
DOI’s compliance with the Act’s multiple-use requirement, which required DOI to 
weigh economic benefits of the land with the preservation of the land, the court 
concluded that DOI complied. Regarding whether current laws and regulations 
would adequately protected the land in question, the court found that DOI correctly 
concluded that existing laws were inadequate. The court dismissed Miners’ 
remaining claims. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from 
the higher court as of publication.  
 
Protecting Ariz.’s Res. & Children v. Fed. Highway Admin., No. 16-16586, No. 16-
16605, 2017 WL 6146939 (9th Cir. Dec. 08, 2017). 
 
District court granted Federal Highway Administration’s (“FHA”) motion for 
summary judgment regarding Advocacy Group’s contention that the approval of a 
section of freeway violated the National Environmental Policy Act and the 
Department of Transportation Act (collectively “Acts”), which Advocacy Groups 
subsequently appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that FHA 
adequately specified its purpose and need for the proposed freeway and provided 
reasonable alternatives. Moreover, FHA adequately discussed hazardous spill 
probabilities and potential mitigation strategies as well as the proposed freeway’s 
potential impact on children’s health and groundwater wells. Thus, FHA’s 
Environmental Impact Statement was sufficiently compliant with the Acts. The 
Ninth Circuit accordingly affirmed the findings of the district court. This is an 
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 
before citing the case as precedent 
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Friends of Capital Crescent Trail v. Fed. Transit Admin., 877 F.3d 1051, (D.C. Cir 
2017).  
 
Activists challenged Agency’s approval of a new rail project, asserting that there 
are problems with another rail service within the city and those problems impacted 
the analysis. State maintained that the systems are largely separate and do not 
significantly impact one another. The lower court found that the systems do impact 
one another, agreeing that if there is a “diminished ridership,” then there is an 
impact on the new light rail system, since many existing users would transition 
over to or take advantage of the new system. The lower court required further 
evaluation and retracted the Record of Decision but allowed Agency to 
independently evaluate the required depth of further analysis based on their 
examination of the new and existing rail systems. Agency claimed that the project 
would function as expected for its intended purpose under any anticipated scenario 
and would cause no negative impacts other than the impacts reported on the first 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), so they did not think a formal 
supplemental environmental impact statement was necessary. The district court 
disagreed, and still required a supplemental EIS because Agency did not adequately 
address concerns about the project and did not show evidence to support their 
determination that new system would work as intended in every scenario. The 
appeals court disagreed with the lower court, finding that Agency was not required 
to explicitly address Tribe’s every concern. Instead, the appeal court held that 
Agency should receive deference because they explained the reasoning behind their 
decision not to do a EIS, which relied upon their specific, specialized knowledge 
and experience. The appeals court likewise affirmed the district court’s 
determination that Activist’s challenges to the original EIS, specifically the 
evaluation of alternatives, were unfounded.  
 
Natural Res. Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d 1202 
(D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
The Natural Resources Defense Council and the Powder River Basin Resource 
Council ("Councils") sued the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
("Commission"), seeking a review of Operator's license to conduct in situ leach 
(“ISL”) uranium mining. Councils contended procedural and substantive errors by 
Commission in approving Operator's license and raised several issues before the 
court. Because of the proximity between potential aquifers and the layers of 
uranium-bearing sandstone, Commission requires production applicants to consider 
the environmental impact and plans for groundwater restoration of proposed 
projects. Along with procedural claims, Councils argued that Operator will 
“inevitably” be required to restore the groundwater associated with the mined 
aquifer, which Councils claimed was unconsidered by Commission during the 
license’s application phase. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
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upheld Commission's decisions during Operator's licensing approval process 
because Commission was not obligated to address Council's contention that 
operator had additional expansion plans.  
 
N.D. Alaska  
 
Abner v. United States Pipe & Foundry, Co., 2:15-cv-02040-KOB, 2018 WL 
522771 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2018). 
 
After the EPA discovered contamination on their properties, Landowners filed both 
tort and property damage claims against Company based upon the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). 
Company filed a motion for summary judgment on most of Landowners’ claims 
based upon failure to state a claim as well as being barred by the state’s statute of 
limitations. The trial court found for Landowners and ruled that they did not need 
to allege that they bore costs of remediating the contamination of their properties 
for a CERCLA claim, but only needed to show that the EPA had expended costs. 
The court also ruled that, since CERCLA applied, the statute of limitations did not 
accrue until the CERCLA action was commenced by the government. This case has 
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of 
publication.  
 
N.D. Indiana  
 
Valbruna Slater Steel Corp. v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., No. 1:10-CV-044 JD, 2018 WL 
446645 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018). 
 
Corporations filed a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against Manufacturers to 
help pay for pollution that they were responsible for on Corporations’ property. 
The trial court found that Manufacturers were entirely liable for the costs of the 
cleanup. The appellate court reapportioned the costs to twenty-five percent to 
Corporations and seventy-five percent to Manufacturers because, despite 
Manufacturers and other third parties being entirely at fault for the contamination, 
Corporations bought the property at a reduced price due to the contamination and 
were aware of it prior to purchase. 
 
W.D. Virginia  
 
Red River Coal Co. v. Sierra Club, No. 2:17CV00021, 2018 WL 491668 (W.D. 
Va. Jan. 19, 2018).  
 
Organizations brought a collective citizen suit against a Coal Company. 
Organizations alleged that the Coal Company violated the federal Clean Water Act 
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(“CWA”) and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”). Coal 
Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
and sought declaratory judgment. Organizations argue that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment. Each party moved to 
dismiss the others claims. The district court found that it did have federal subject 
matter jurisdiction because the Organizations’ claim arouse under the CWA. 
Organizations claim that Coal Company is discharging pollutants without permit 
authorization under the CWA. These discharges result in elevated levels of total 
dissolved solid and conductivity in the streams into which the underdrains 
discharge. Organizations also claim that Coal Company is required to comply with 
Virginia SMCRA under its SMCRA permit. A Virginia state regulation requires 
that waters must be free from substances or waste that are “inimical or harmful to 
human, animal, plant, or aquatic life.” The district court found that there is a 
genuine issue of fact regarding whether the CWA controls underdrains and are 
therefore subject to the CWA’s permit requirement. Therefore, because the court 
did have subject matter jurisdiction and there was a claim, the court dismissed the 






Central Coast Forest Ass'n v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2018).  
 
Companies harvested timber from lands in an area where coho salmon spawn. 
Companies petitioned the Fish and Game Commission (“Commission”) to delist 
the coho salmon south of San Francisco from the endangered species register in 
California. For a species to be considered endangered in an area, it must be wild 
and native to that area. Companies argued that coho salmon were never native to 
the streams south of San Francisco; instead, Companies argued that the fish only 
existed within these streams because of hatchery plants or artificial placement. 
Commission denied Companies’ assertions that the coho salmon were not native to 
the streams, and subsequently denied the petition to delist them as an endangered 
species in this area. Commission relied on evidence dating back to the time when 
the coho salmon were listed. Companies appealed. The Supreme Court of 
California held that the California Endangered Species Act (“the Act”) permitted 
Companies to bring a petition for the delisting of a species using new evidence and 
reversed and remanded the issue. On remand, the appellate concluded, however, 
that the evidence presented by Companies did not meet the necessary threshold for 
a delisting. The court held that the petition did not contain sufficient scientific 
evidence, considered in light of the department’s scientific report and expertise, to 
justify delisting the coho salmon south of San Francisco, and, therefore, there was 
no sufficient evidence that the delisting might have been warranted. 
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City of Long Beach v. City of Los Angeles, A148993, 2018 WL 387934 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Jan. 1, 2018). 
 
Group, comprised of individuals and government officials, filed a suit seeking to 
set aside the Final Environmental Impact Report (“FEIR”) allowing the 
construction of a new railyard a few miles from the Port of Los Angeles. The trial 
court found that the FEIR was deficient because it failed to address the impact of 
the project on the growth. The trial court also found that the FEIR was inadequate 
on the impact of the project on the noise, air pollution, and air quality. The circuit 
court of appeals noted that the FEIR was not misleading about the project and 
noted that the operation of the project would have a significant impact on the air 
quality due to the air pollution. The appeals court also noted that the FEIR 
adequately met the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act.  
 
City of Modesto v. Dow Che. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 764 (Cal Ct. App. 2018). 
 
City sued dry cleaning businesses (“Business”), alleging that Businesses had caused 
damage to City’s groundwater. City sought damages for past, present, and future 
costs of the contamination’s cleanup under the Polanco Redevelopment Act 
(“Polanco”), which authorizes redevelopment agencies to remediate contamination 
found at property within the agency’s jurisdiction. The appellate court vacated the 
trial court’s ruling, holding that the causation standard should be whether it is more 
likely than not that Businesses were a substantial factor in creating the 
contamination. Under Polanco, liability could be proven through circumstantial 
evidence if sufficient to lead a reasonable finder of fact to find that a defendant’s 
activity was a contributing factor to the contamination. This opinion of the court is 
certified for partial publication; therefore, state court rules should be consulted 




Adams v. Grefer, 17-250 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d 201. 
 
Residents alleged that Oil and Gas Corporations (“Corporations”) operations 
exposed them to naturally occurring radioactive material. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Corporations and fifty-six Residents appealed. On 
appeal, the appellate court held that Corporations had met their burden of proof that 
their actions did not cause harm to Residents. Under Louisiana law, Residents must 
provide evidence that Corporations “substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiff’s injuries.” Under the facts of the case, Corporations met this burden by 
providing affidavits from an expert health physicist in support of their motions, 
shifting the burden to Residents to show that a genuine issue of fact existed, which 
they were unable to do. The appellate court accordingly affirmed the trial court 
decision. 
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Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 2017 MT 324, 390 
Mont. 76, 408 P.3d 515. 
 
Mining Company appealed the trial court’s order that required Mining Company to 
pay Property Owners restorative damages under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). The court considered 
three issues: (1) whether Property Owners’ claim complied with CERCLA’s timing 
of review provision; (2) whether Property Owners were “potentially responsible 
parties,” meaning that their restoration activities required EPA approval; and (3) 
whether Property Owners’ claim was preempted because it conflicted with 
CERCLA. As to the first issue, the court determined that Property Owners’ claim 
complied with CERCLA’s timing of review provision because the claim did not 
qualify as a challenge to the CERCLA mandated cleanup. As to the second issue, 
the court determined that Property Owners were not potentially responsible parties 
because they did not fall into any of the three recognized categories of responsible 
parties. The court reasoned that the designation as a potentially responsible party 
can occur through three ways: (1) when the party voluntarily settles with the EPA; 
(2) when a court makes a determination that an actor is a responsible party; and (3) 
when a party is a defendant in a CERCLA lawsuit. As to the third issue, the court 
determined that there was no express nor implied preemption of Property Owners’ 
claim by CERCLA. 
 
New Jersey  
 
Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Nos. A–3485–13T1, A–5407–
13T1, 2017 WL 6546973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2017).   
 
Property Owner applied to Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) for a 
permit and exception to begin a “remedial action work plan.” DEP granted the 
application and a related Company’s application for a Class B Recycling Center 
permit to produce alternative fill for use in the plan on Property Owner’s property. 
Environmental Conservation Group appealed DEP’s approval of both applications 
based upon several arguments. The court of appeals, rejecting many of the 
arguments and finding others lacked merit, affirmed the DEP’s approval of both 
applications. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Yadav v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.-Land Use Regulation, No. A–4035–15T2, 2017 
WL 6398931 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2017).  
 
Property Owner appealed the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection’s (“DEP”) decision to cancel Property Owner’s application for a letter of 
interpretation authenticating the position of wetlands, transition areas, and State 
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open waters on their land. The court stated that Property Owner had the burden of 
showing that the DEP’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.” The 
court determined that Property Owner did not meet this burden of proof, because 
the record evidenced that Property Owner had failed to comply with DEP’s 
reasonable requests for modifications to their application. This is an unpublished 
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing 
the case as precedent. 
 
New Mexico  
 
Cmtys. for Clean Water v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm’n., NO. A-1-
CA-35253, 2017 WL 6884309 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017). 
 
Clean water advocates (“Advocates”) sued State Water Quality Control 
Commission (“Commission”) after Advocates’ request for a public hearing was 
denied by State Environment Department (“Department”). Advocates request for a 
public hearing was in relation to a Department of Energy water discharge permit 
application. After the request was denied by Department on the grounds that the 
permit had “already contemplated community involvement and was in the public 
interest,” Commission upheld the denial by a nine-to-two vote. Because governing 
state law provides that Commission can deny a request for public hearing only 
when there is no substantial public interest, Advocates argued that Commission 
exceeded its discretionary authority by denying the request for public hearing. 
Commission argued that its denial complied with state law and that the relevant 
regulation’s language requiring an “opportunity for a public hearing” does not 
necessarily require a public hearing. Noting the relevant state law’s plain language 
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings on comparable language, the appellate 
court held that the state legislature had meant to empower the Department with 
only “limited discretion” in making public hearing determinations. Because the 
appellate court found that the factors cited by Commission in upholding the denial 
were not supported by substantial evidence, the court ultimately reversed 




In re Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v. Jewish Home Lifecare, 90 N.E.3d 1253 (N.Y. 
2017). 
 
Operator applied to the Department of Health (“DOH”) for consent to construct a 
new nursing home on a vacant lot in New York City located next to Organization’s 
school. Operator filed an Environmental Assessment Statement (“EAS”) which 
triggered the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) review process. 
The review found that the project posed a potential risk of exposure to lead and 
lead dust. The review also analyzed the potential impact of construction noise to 
the surrounding area. DOH concluded that the potential impact of lead and lead 
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dust were mitigated and would not pose a risk because the excavated dirt would be 
removed from the site and the monitoring and containment measures in place to 
combat the dust, including tarps and sprinklers, were sufficient to prevent the dust 
from getting into the public airways. After public hearings, DOH imposed 
additional procedures on Operator, which included installing noise-reducing 
windows to Organization’s school, installing window air conditioners to the 
classrooms lacking them, and erecting a 16-foot sound barrier wall. Organization 
sought to vacate the determination by DOH arguing it did not adequately address 
the environmental concerns, particularly the use of a tent over the construction site 
and the installation of central air conditioning for Organization’s school. 
Organization argued that the standards that DOH used to evaluate the lead and dust 
were outdated. The court held that DOH used accepted federal and state standards 
when it evaluated the site. The court also held that DOH acted within is authority 
when choosing between alternatives to mitigate the dangers. The fact that 
Organization preferred different actions did not mean DOH did not make the 




United Envtl. Grp., Inc. v. GKK McKnight, LP, 176 A.3d 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2017). 
 
The gas station’s Previous Owner sold the property to Purchaser. Previous Owner 
asked Environmental Company to perform environmental remediation services, 
including removing tanks. Environmental Company submitted a quote for its work 
and Previous Owner accepted and entered into a contract for the services. 
Environmental Company immediately began work and discovered contaminated 
soil on the land. Environmental Company immediately notified Previous Owner 
and Purchaser, as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection and Pennsylvania’s Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund, 
which reimburses individuals for remediation costs. Environmental Company 
informed Previous Owner and Purchaser that due to this discovery, more work 
would have to be done, which the parties agreed to. After remediation was 
complete, Previous Owner and Purchaser failed to pay the full balance of their 
invoices due to Environmental Company, and Environmental Company sued for 
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, continuing services, and damages under the 
Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“Act”). At trial, a jury found for 
Environmental Company; however. Environmental Company appealed the verdict 
because it was not granted relief for its claim under the Act. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania held that the trial court erred when it held that Environmental 
Company’s claims under the Act were foreclosed as a matter of law because the 
claims were never tried before any factfinder. However, the court held that the trial 
court properly declined Purchaser’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict because there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the parties 
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agreed to alter the contract. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed in part 




Douglass v. Shamrock Paving, Inc., 406 P.3d 1155 (Wash. 2017). 
 
Paving Company (“Company”) used Landowner’s land for storing, cleaning, and 
fueling its machines while carrying out a paving project. During that time, 
Company spilled unknown amounts of heavy lube oil on the property causing 
damage to the soil. Landowners engaged an environmental consulting firm to 
investigate the contamination and to perform cleanup, which consisted of removing 
sixty-eight tons of soil. Landowners sued Company for trespass and nuisance and 
also asserted a claim under the Model Toxics Control Act for cleanup costs. 
Landowners prevailed on the trespass and nuisance claims, but the court denied 
cleanup costs on the grounds that Landowners failed to prove that the substance 
was an environmental threat. On appeal, the court reversed the lower court’s 
decision, finding Landowner did conduct remedial action when Landowners tested 
the soil. However, the court deferred to the trial court’s findings that Landowners 
could not recover for cleanup costs because the lube oil was not a hazardous 
substance. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, and the 
court held that the costs of soil testing could be recovered as remedial costs, but not 
the costs incurred in cleaning up the spill. 
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